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Introduction 
This paper and the accompanying spreadsheets are intended as an aid to those 
negotiating financing terms with venture capitalists (VCs).  It is hoped that through using 
this methodology those in this position (hence forth referred to as entrepreneurs) will be 
able to construct an argument to help justify their requests for higher valuations, lower 
venture capital ownership or the use of less aggressive securities. 
 
Venture Capital Financing Negotiations 
Venture capital is an important source of capital for small growing companies.  In 
2003 over $22bn was invested in such companies1. In exchange for this funding, venture 
capitalists receive equity ownership in the company.  The value of the firm, the amount 
of ownership that the entrepreneur must give to the venture capitalist, and the form of 
equity given up, are all interrelated and disputed during fund raising negotiations.   
 The “Venture Capital Method” is used as a framework for this analysis.  Given 
the expected sale/IPO (Initial Public Offering) year, the expected sale/IPO value, the 
required rate of return (to compensate the venture capitalist for systematic risk, liquidity, 
value added and a cash flow adjustment), and the amount of investment currently needed, 
the Venture Capital Method will value the entrepreneur’s business and the amount of 
equity that must surrendered to the Venture Capitalist.  The final sale/IPO value is 
discounted back at the venture capitalist’s required rate of return (usually 30% for late 
stage and 50% for early stage) to the date of investment.  The percentage of the 
 
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree(TM) Report, Data: Thomson Financial  
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company’s equity that the venture capitalist will require will be the venture capitalist’s 
investment divided by this discounted terminal value.  The post money valuation is 
investment divided by the percentage of ownership acquired. 
 It is important to note that date and value of sale/IPO are facts that will be 
revealed ex-post, whose expectations will be the subject of discussion rather than 
negotiation.  The venture capitalist’s required rate of return could be a topic of 
negotiation but in practice tends to be the accepted by the entrepreneur and becomes 
treated as almost a fact, around which other negotiations and discussions take place.   
 In the post-dotcom era, it has become more and more common for venture 
capitalists to demand equity not in the form of common stock, but rather more exotic 
versions of preferred equity.  The increased bargaining power of venture capitalists 
during this period stems from the scarcity of capital; however, venture capitalists often 
justify their demands as risk mitigants (which normally affect the payouts in the case of 
liquidation or sale, rather than IPO).  The negotiation of these securities, in theory, takes 
place after, or at least as separately as possible from, the negotiation over valuation using 
the Venture Capital Method, although in practice negotiations become interdependent.  
The valuation was justified on the basis that the venture capitalist must meet his/her 
required rate of return to compensate for the risk inherent in the business activity.  
However, this paper will show that the addition of these securities will cause the venture 
capitalist to receive a return in excess of the stated goal.  
 There is often a misunderstanding on the part of entrepreneurs, who, while they 
realize that these securities are detrimental, fail to quantify or accurately comprehend the 
value they are giving up.  This paper will explain a methodology of quantifying the value 
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of these securities, not just for the entrepreneur’s edification, but also as a tool to aid the 
entrepreneur in negotiation.  If the entrepreneur can demonstrate to the venture capitalist 
that he/she is receiving a larger return than the one used to justify the valuation, this puts 
pressure on the venture capitalist to agree to a more attractive valuation or some other 
compensation for the entrepreneur.  It is important to note, however, that this is pressure, 
not a magic pill, and ultimately supply and demand are much stronger forces on price of 
venture capital equity.  
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Venture Capital Securities 
Some of the securities demanded by venture capitalists are listed and their most 
relevant characteristics are summarized below: 
 
Common Stock 
This is the most basic type of security, and is, in fact, rarely taken by venture 
capitalists.  It is normally the form of stock held by entrepreneurs and employees.  All 
dividends and returns on liquidation that are available to common stock holders are split 
pro rata. 
 
Liquidation Preferences 
Venture capitalists sometimes demand preferred stock that has liquidation 
preferences.  This means that upon liquidation or sale of the company, the venture 
capitalist will receive a multiple (referred to in the model as ) of his/her investment 
(referred to in the model as I) before common stock holders divide the remaining value.  
The multiple is negotiated upon issuance of the security, and is referred to with the suffix 
“x”, as in 3x being that the venture capitalist receives three times his/her investment 
before the remaining value is divided up by common stock holders.  If the proceeds from 
the sale or liquidation are not sufficient to cover the liquidation preference, all of the 
proceeds will be paid to the venture capitalist and the common stock holders will receive 
nothing.   
 
Valuation of Venture Capital Securities  7 
 Copyright © A. Lloyd Thomas, 2006 
Participation 
On top of liquidation preferences, the venture capitalist can demand preferred 
stock with participation rights.  Upon liquidation or sale of the company, not only with 
the venture capitalist receive the liquidation preference, but the remaining value will be 
distributed not only among common stock holders but also to the venture capitalist as 
well.  Normally this sort of preferred stock is converted on a 1:1 basis to common stock 
(although this can differ, this model is based on this assumption), after the liquidation 
preference payment is made, and thus the venture capitalist participates in the remaining 
distribution as if he/she held common stock, and gains the same percentage of the 
remaining value to be distributed as the percentage of common stock he/she would own if 
converted (referred to in the model as ).   
 
Participation Caps 
Participating preferred, as it is called, can often lead to excessive returns for the 
venture capitalist.  Sometimes entrepreneurs can succeed in negotiating a “cap” on 
participation.  In this case the proceeds from the sale/liquidation are capped usually at a 
multiple of investment (referred to in the model as  – kappa).  Thus if there is a 3x cap 
on participation, this means that the venture capitalist participates until three times the 
investment has been recovered in total (i.e. proceeds from liquidation preference + 
proceeds from participation = 3 x investment).  This is probably the most likely positive 
result from using the analysis in this paper: the entrepreneur may succeed in negotiating a 
small cap on participation after the extent of the venture capitals profit is made plain to 
both parties. 
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Redeemable Participating Preferred 
This is a security that has become somewhat more common over the past few 
years.  It is essentially the same as participating preferred, except that the liquidation 
preference is computed after the venture receives the full principle of the investment 
back, thus effectively lifting the liquidation preference by one, (e.g. from 2x to 3x). 
Valuation of Venture Capital Securities  9 
 Copyright © A. Lloyd Thomas, 2006 
Option Pricing 
The model to be explained relies on reader’s ability to view these securities as a 
series of options.  These options will be all be translated into European call options to be 
valued using the Black-Scholes methodology.  It is therefore useful if the reader has some 
basic comprehension of Black-Scholes formula (for information see references in the 
bibliography), although it can just as easily be viewed as a valuation “black box” into 
which the call option parameters as fed.  The translation of these options relies on the 
principles of Put/Call Parity, which is summarized below. 
 
Put/Call Parity2
Option translation is easiest to understand if their payoff schedules are compared 
graphically.  On the left is an example of 
the payoff schedule of common equity.  
The value of the security (y axis) increases 
in a linear fashion as the value of the firm 
(x axis) increases.  The diagram on the 
right is an illustration of the payoff schedule of an investor who is short common equity: 
it is exactly the same except the negative function.   
 Call options only pay out once the strike price has been reached.  It then pays off 
positively in a linear fashion.  On the left below, the call option payouts are shown, and 
the corresponding payouts of being short this security are shown below on the right. 
 
2 Diagrams in this section are not copyrighted, but are taken from 
http://www.optionpricer.free.fr/strats.html and http://www.riskglossary.com/link/put_call_parity.htm
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Put options, the right to sell, pay off in a negative linear fashion until the strike is 
reached.  The payoff schedule for this security is shown below on the left.  The 
corresponding short position is shown below on the right.   
These options are additive, and thus they can be combined with each other or 
even flat payments to produce other payoff schedules as illustrated below: 
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The diagram above, Put/Call Parity, shows how these options can be added 
together to make synthetic versions of each other.  These principles can be extended to 
hugely broaden the number of options that can be converted into European call options.  
The technique of adding two sloping sections with perfectly negatively correlated 
gradients to create flat payoffs (as shown in the bottom row of the diagram above) will be 
used extensively in the model to follow. 
 These payoff schedules are also multiplicative. That is to say that the gradient of 
the payoffs can be increased by owning multiple securities.  For example, a doubling of 
the gradient can be achieved by owning two of the securities. 
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Pre-valuation Negotiations/Discussions/Assumptions 
 
As noted before, several of the inputs of the model are assumed to be fixed, but 
are in fact unknowable (but somewhat predictable) ex ante.  It is useful therefore that 
before these securities are analyzed, these parameters values are estimated.  In order to 
effectively negotiate on the inclusion of these securities, it is important that the venture 
capitalist and entrepreneur make each other aware of their assumptions with regards to 
these values.  Thus there will be no confusion during the discussions over whether the 
subject of negotiation is these assumed values (e.g. sale price, sale date) or on inclusion 
and parameters of these securities (e.g. liquidation preference, participation cap). 
 
These assumptions are: 
• The expected year of sale/IPO/liquidation 
• The expected value of sale/IPO/liquidation 
• The probability of IPO vs. sale/liquidation 
• The venture capitalist’s required rate of return (after valuation this will be shown 
to be false) 
• The risk free rate 
• The volatility of the firm’s equity 
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A Note on Notation 
The model in the next section will use the following notation (in alphabetical order).  
 
Common Notation 
 The fraction of the equity that the venture capitalist would own if all preferred 
stock was converted to common stock, often given as a percentage. = v/n (see 
below) 
 The cap on participation as multiple of investment, (e.g. 1, 2, or 2.5 etc).  Referred 
to in prose or speech as  x (e.g. 1x, 2x, 2.5x etc.) 
 Liquidation preference as a multiple of investment (e.g. 1, 2, or 2.5 etc).  Referred 
to in prose or speech as  x (e.g. 1x, 2x, 2.5x etc.) 
n total number of common shares of the firm if all venture capital securities were 
converted to common, referred to sometimes using quotations as “common 
shares”, to distinguish it from actually common equity that does not have a linear 
profile, but is in fact, a call option (see below) 
v the total number of common shares that would be held by the venture capitalist if 
all venture capital securities were converted to common 
 
BS[S0, X, T, rf, volatility]is the output of Black-Scholes European Call Option 
Calculator with inputs: 
S0 Current price of underlying 
X European call option exercise price 
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t Expected sale/liquidation year 
rf Risk free rate 
& Volatility of underlying 
 
Firm Value Method Notation 
I Total venture capitalist investment 
' Post-money valuation 
S Estimated volatility of the value of the total equity of the firm 
 
Per Security Method Notation 
i Total venture capitalist investment per share or security 
( Post money valuation per share (or L /n) 
s Estimated volatility of the value of the common stock if all venture capital 
securities were converted. 
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The Model 
The model for valuing these venture capital securities is explained step by step 
below.  Valuing the venture capitalist’s returns on the entire investment, by comparing it 
to changes in value of the total equity of the firm (the Firm Value Method), is much more 
intuitive and is thus discussed first.  The task of valuing an individual unit of a security 
(the Security Value Method) held by venture capitalist is slightly more complex and is 
explained subsequently.  The model will show that these securities are can be seen to be 
common stock plus a package of long and short call options.   
 
The Firm Value Method (FVM) 
Liquidation Preference 
This security allows the venture capitalist to claim all value from the enterprise 
that has been invested in, up to a limit, usually a multiple of his/her investment, 
liquidation preference x investment (or I).  This can be seen as a call option on firm 
value with a strike at the value that fully satisfies the preference (the return rights of the 
venture capitalist I), which is subtracted (and therefore is a short call) from the right to 
all returns from the sale no matter what the value (the value of which is the post-money 
valuation, by definition, the value of the total equity, ').The return profile is displayed 
below - the dotted line represents the fully satisfied liquidation preference, I (and strike 
price): 
Valuation of Venture Capital Securities  16 
 Copyright © A. Lloyd Thomas, 2006 
 
Thus the value of this security is: 
' - BS[', I, t, rf, S] 
 
Participation 
This security allows the venture capitalist to receive returns above his/her 
liquidation preference in proportion to his/her ownership of common shares if his/her 
preferred shares were converted ().  This is similar to a call option, with the strike at the 
fully satisfied liquidation preference, except that the venture capitalist does not receive 
the full amount of the increase in value, only a fraction of it, thus it is the fraction of 
converted common shares () x a call option on the firm, with a strike of where the 
liquidation preference is satisfied (I).  The return profile is displayed below: 
 
The value of this security is therefore: 
 * BS[', I, t, rf, S] 
V
C
R
eturn
V
C
R
eturn
V
C
R
eturn
Total Equity Value Total Equity Value 
I I
Gradient = 
V
C
R
eturn I
Total Equity Value 
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Participation Caps 
If a cap on participation has been negotiated, the venture capitalist only 
participates above the liquidation preference until the cap is satisfied.  That is to say as 
the value of the firm rises above this value, (I), the venture capitalist’s return is flat.  
Thus participation will look like this: 
 
This flattening of the gradient can be done using the method alluded to in the 
options section above, by adding the corresponding short position.  Adding a function 
that grows negatively to a function that grows positively of the same magnitude will 
cancel each other out, leading to a function that neither grows nor decays.  This 
corresponding function is therefore  short call options with a strike price I. This is 
displayed below: 
 
The value reduction that results from the addition of a cap on participation is therefore: 
 * BS[', ( I), t, rf, S] 
I
Gradient = 
V
C
R
eturn I
Total Equity Value 
IGradient = 
V
C
R
eturn I
Total Equity Value 
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Capped Participating Preferred 
Capped participation securities are usually held in conjunction with the 
liquidation preferences as Capped Participating Preferred Stock.  The venture capitalist’s 
total return function is thus displayed below: 
 
The value of this position can therefore be computed in the following way: 
Liquidation Preference  + Participation   - Cap (if present) adjustment 
=
' - BS[', I, t, rf, S]  +  * BS[', I, t, rf, S] -  * BS[', ( I), t, rf, S] 
 
I
Gradient = 0 
Gradient = 
I
Gradient = 1 
V
C
R
eturn
Total Equity Value
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The Security Value Method (SVM) 
We can also measure these securities on a per share or per security basis.  That is 
to say we can create a security which is a package of sub-securities which would be 
analogous to a share (if these securities did not exist).  For example, if instead of the 
venture capitalist receiving one million shares of common stock, it was negotiated that 
he/she would receive equity in the form of participating preferred, he she would receive 
one million securities of participating preferred (assuming a 1:1 conversion), that were 
made up of one sub-security that behaves way that common stock would if the venture 
capitalist owned only common stock, and a set of sub-securities that will behave similarly 
to the liquidation preference described in the introduction, plus a set of sub-securities that 
behaves similarly to the capped or uncapped participation described introduction.  Thus, 
in order to compute the total value of the venture capitalist’s position, the value of the 
participating preferred security must be multiplied by the number of these securities that 
were issued to the venture capitalist.   
 
Liquidation Preference 
This liquidation preference is similar to the one described in the FVM, however, it 
is important to note, that as this valuation is on a per security basis, the strike price is not 
the liquidation preference multiplied by the investment, it is the liquidation preference 
multiplied by the venture capitalist’s investment on a per security basis, i (or I/n).  
Furthermore, the venture capitalist claims all shareholders returns until the preference is 
satisfied and thus he/she does not just hold an option on each share he/she owns, but on 
all the “common stock” of the firm (if the venture capitalist’s position were converted), 
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therefore the security must be multiplied by 1/(fraction owned), or 1/ . Thus if the 
venture capitalist owned 33% of the shares (if converted to common), he/she would be 
entitled to have 3 of these sub-securities included in his/her security. 
 As in the FVM this security is made by subtracting call options from equity to 
make the marginal return zero after the liquidation preference has been satisfied.  On a 
per share basis, therefore, these returns are analogous to subtracting 1/  call options (the 
strike is the value of the fully satisfied liquidation preference on a per share basis) from 
the returns of1/  shares of common stock (which are valued today at the post money 
valuation per share, ().  The return profile is displayed below: 
 
Thus the value of this sub security is: 
(1/ * () – (1/ * BS[(, i, t, rf, s]) 
Participation 
As in the FVM case above, this is a call option.  It is intuitive that the strike would 
be the value of the fully satisfied liquidation preference per share/security (i).  However, 
it is actually a call option on one share of common stock if all venture capital securities 
were converted, as the venture capitalist and entrepreneur participate in proportion to the 
Gradient = 1/
Gradient = 1/
i
“Common Stock” Value
V
C
Security
V
al.
V
C
Security
V
al.
“Common Stock” Value
i
V
C
Security
V
alue
Gradient = 1/
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number of shares they would own assuming this conversion.  Thus the gradient is not ,
but 1.  The return profile is displayed below: 
 
The value of this security is therefore: 
BS[(, i, t, rf, s] 
 
Participation Caps 
A cap can also be added in the SVM.  The value per common share where the 
venture capitalist no longer participates will now be (i).  Thus participation will look 
like this: 
 
This flattening of the gradient can once again be done by adding the 
corresponding short position.  This corresponding function is therefore 1 short call option 
with a strike price i. This is displayed below: 
i
Gradient = 1 
i
“Common Stock” Value
V
C
Security
V
al.
Gradient = 0 
i
“Common Stock” Value
V
C
Security
V
al.
Gradient = 1 
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The value reduction that results from the addition of a cap on participation on a per 
security basis is therefore: 
BS[(, (i), t, rf, s] 
 
Capped Participating Preferred 
Once again this is the addition of these securities.  The return profile is displayed 
below: 
 
The value of this position can therefore be computed in the following way: 
Liquidation Preference   + Participation  + Cap (if present) 
=
(1/ * () – (1/ * BS[(, i, t, rf, s])  + BS[(, i, t, rf, s] - BS[(, (i), t, rf, s] 
i
Gradient = 1 
i
“Common Stock” Value
V
C
Security
V
alue
Gradient = 0 
Gradient = 1/
i
Gradient = 1 
i
“Common Stock” Value
V
C
Security
V
al.
Valuation of Venture Capital Securities  23 
 Copyright © A. Lloyd Thomas, 2006 
 
It may be desirable to analyze the excess value that that the venture capitalist is 
receiving by viewing the security as a common share and additional sub-securities.  This 
can be done by subtracting one common share from the formula above such that now the 
security’s value can be expressed as 
Common share  + Package of sub-securities 
=
Common share + Modified Liq. Preference + Participation + Cap (if present) 
=
( + {[(1/O -1)* (] – (1/O * BS[R, Si, t, rf, s])} + BS[R, Si, t, rf, s]- BS[R, (Ui), t, rf, s] 
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Limitations 
Garbage in / Garbage Out 
As stated previously, certain parameters have to be negotiated before valuation, or 
at least both parties have to be aware of each other’s assumptions.  Most of these 
assumptions (such as the likely sale price and year of sale) are difficult to predict and thus 
this model is only as good as these predictions.   
 
Simplifications 
Deterministic/Stochastic Model 
Although this model is based on Black-Scholes, and could thus be said to be 
stochastic, many of the model’s assumptions listed above are in random or semi-random, 
and thus the assumption of these values means that the output of this model is predicated 
on the fact that these values are known ex ante, which is not the case. 
 
Seniority 
The model has tacitly assumed that there is no debt in the firm, which is often the 
case for these companies.  This assumption, however, is not binding, and the analysis will 
be similar when traditional debt is present. 
However, this model assumes that the venture capitalist’s securities are the most 
senior equity in the firm.  This is a fair assumption in the case that this is the last round of 
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financing.  It is, however, probable that the firm may undergo another round of financing.  
In this case, it is likely that the new equity will be senior to the equity being valued in the 
model and thus this will have a large effect on the payout.  Although the Venture Capital 
Method of valuation takes such scenarios into account (poorly), this model does not. 
 
Conversion 
This model assumes 1:1 conversion of these securities to common stock; 
however, it would not be very difficult to use a different conversion ratio.   
 
IPO 
The valuation model above assumes that the firm will be sold or liquidated for an 
assumed price in an assumed year.  It therefore does not include the possibility of an IPO 
of the firm.  This is a huge problem, as many Venture Capitalists see IPO as their goal for 
exit.  In most cases, upon IPO, the venture capitalist’s equity is converted to common and 
thus these securities and their payoffs no longer exist.  
 There are, however, some methods that can be used to attempt to factor in the IPO 
condition, however, none of them are theoretically perfect.  As with the other 
assumptions, the value and timing or IPO are not predictable ex ante, but can be 
estimated inaccurately.  One approach would be to value the securities according to the 
method above, use the Venture Capital method in the case of IPO and then weight these 
values according to the probability of IPO vs Sale/Liquidation.  However, the actual 
causation of an IPO is somewhat internal, that is to say that both the venture capitalist 
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and entrepreneur have some control over its occurrence, and thus they may attempt to 
initiate or block an IPO depending on how it affects their returns.  This makes it a real 
option and thus can not be valued by weighting expectations.  
 
The Nature of Common Stock 
Throughout this paper the venture capitalist’s returns are compared to that of 
common stock.  There is an implicit assumption that these are independent, which is 
absolutely not the case.  The common stock return profile is not linear with the value of 
the firm as most equity is (above 0), as has been described above: 
 
It is the existence of these venture capital securities that causes this not to be the 
case.  It is because of this that returns have been compared to returns to common stock as
if all venture capital securities were converted, which has been referred to using 
quotations marks, “common stock”, rather than common stock. The reason for this 
discrepancy is that the liquidation preference means that common stock receives no 
proceeds to until total equity value has increased beyond to value of the fully satisfied 
Total Equity Value
C
om
m
on
Stock
R
eturn
Gradient = 1 
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liquidation preference.  Furthermore, if there is a cap, the common stock returns are 
boosted by the fact that venture capitalist is no longer participating.  An example of this 
return on a per share basis is shown below 
 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that this is also a series of call options.  The 
section before the venture capitalist cap has been reached (i) is a call option with strike 
i, (as the entrepreneur has no returns before this value), with a similar call option with 
strike i subtracted from it, to make the return of that sub-security flat after the end of 
venture capital participation (i), such that the next section can be added to a blank slate.  
Consequently the section after the venture capitalist’s participation is capped is also just a 
call option, except that the common stock holder receives returns that would have gone to 
the venture capitalist if there was no cap, thus the gradient will be greater.  Using the 
same logic as above, this will be 1/the percentage equity ownership of the common stock 
holder, or in this example, 1/(1-).  These call options can thus be valued using Black-
Scholes. 
 
i
Gradient = 1 
i
“Common Stock” Value  
= value of common stock if all VC securities were converted 
C
om
m
on
Stock
V
alue
Gradient = 1/(1-)
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Black-Scholes 
One of the most obvious weaknesses of this model is the limited applicability of 
the Black-Scholes option pricing models.  This model should only be used in certain 
conditions.  The table below sets out the conditions, and why some of these conditions 
are not met: 
Condition Condition met (yes, no, sort of)? If no, why? 
Short selling possible Sort of: A security like this could written, imperfectly 
No arbitrage opportunities No: The post money valuation using the venture 
capital method is not priced by a market, although it 
is difficult to see how to take advantage of this. 
Trading is continuous NO. This is the largest violation.  Venture capital 
securities are rarely traded, and tend to be revalued 
upon subsequent rounds of financing. 
No transaction costs or taxes No. Transaction costs are large due to the magnitude 
of the investment and its opaque nature which 
requires due diligence.  Taxes do indeed exist 
Securities are perfectly divisible Sort of.  Very small denominations can be made 
when the share classes are created 
Risk free rate exists, is constant Sort of.  This is a fair assumption to make 
Maturity dates constant  NO. This is another huge flaw, discussed in above. 
Volatility is known NO.  This is another large flaw.  The volatility of the 
investment is not known, but can be approximated 
(poorly) from publicly traded comparables 
Valuation of Venture Capital Securities  29 
 Copyright © A. Lloyd Thomas, 2006 
The Template, a Practical Example, and a Conclusion 
A template for entrepreneurs is attached.  The template is currently set to the 
parameters of a fictional example of how the valuation works.   
The particular circumstances for this example are: 
The model computes the value of the venture capital securities using both the FVM and 
the SVM assuming the venture capitalist receives common stock, non-participating 
preferred (in this case the liquidation preference is 2 x), capped participating preferred (in 
this case the cap is 4 x), uncapped participating preferred and redeemable participating 
preferred.  It also computes the venture capitalist’s actual rate of return for each security 
and the valuation necessary to maintain the target using the formula: 
(I *(expected sale price- actual preference payment)  - I
(I*(VC target return)sale year - actual preference payment 
As one can see from the results above, these securities have a much greater value 
than the initial investment ($5m) or FVM or converted common stock value ($3.20) for 
SVM.  In most cases (except non-participating securities), the venture capitalist’s return 
is actually in excess of the 30% demanded.   
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The fact that there is a discrepancy between the implication of the IRR and 
security valuations demonstrates how the venture capital method is in imperfect method 
of valuation, and shows the model’s vulnerability to the incorrect no-arbitrage 
assumption.   
This “valuation to maintain target” feature should be very useful in negotiations 
as this is the fair value that the venture capitalist should accept if he/she was serious 
about only wanting a 30% return. 
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The Future 
The most logical areas to extend this research would be to tackle the limitations of the 
model:  
• This model could be complemented by another model for the assumptions: 
o The expected year of sale/IPO/liquidation 
o The expected value of sale/IPO/liquidation 
o The probability of IPO vs. sale/liquidation 
o The volatility of the firm’s equity 
• Including a feature where by the effects of predicted subsequent financing rounds 
can be included 
• Including a feature to account for preferred:common conversion ratios that are not 
1:1 
• Including a feature to account for the possibility or probability of an IPO, and the 
returns that would be generated 
o An extension of this would be to use real options framework to account 
for shareholder control over timing and likelihood of IPO, although Dr. 
Fluck has made a good start on this subject 
• Modeling venture capital returns in comparison with actual common stock 
returns, not “common stock” (as if all venture capital securities were converted) 
• Researching some way to overcome the limitations of Black-Scholes, perhaps 
using binomial lattices 
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